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THE DUBIOUS UPGRADE OF INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTS
Gabriel Swiney∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Dozens of agencies fund development projects around the world.
Some agencies are the creatures of states, such as the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID). Other agencies are
multinational or transnational, such as the Asian Development Bank,
the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank. These
agencies pursue development goals in a number of ways: they may
promote the rule of law, give loans to government treasuries, or pay
the salaries of local teachers. In addition, many development agencies
fund a variety of crucial construction projects in developing countries.
Construction projects are inherently rife with pitfalls. Design flaws
can surface, unforeseen conditions can cause delays, natural or manmade disasters can strike mid-project, and disputes can arise among
funding agencies, local governments, and the contractors who actually
perform the construction. The risky and complicated nature of these
projects compels development agencies to utilize detailed contracts.
These development agencies may be simultaneously funding dozens, if
not hundreds, of international development contracts at any given
time.
Development agencies avoid the confusion and expense of
hundreds of different contracts by using model contracts. These
models provide a set of basic contractual provisions—often called the
“General Conditions”—that can be copied verbatim for each
construction project. The general contracting parties can amend and
supplement the General Conditions as needed by attaching
individualized “Particular Conditions” for specific projects.1
There are a number of advantages to using model contracts.

∗

J.D., Harvard Law School; Bachelor of Civil Law, University of Oxford.
Member of the bar of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
1
For example, model International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC)
contracts and agreements are available at http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/
(last visited 21 Aug. 2006).

145

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 3

The use of standard forms is a source of
contractual predictability and stability, thus reducing
transaction cost for the participants. For example, a
systematic approach to the tendering procedure that
sets out a transparent and efficient approach for
obtaining, evaluating, and selecting bidders will
decrease the costs of tailor-made procedures.2
Model contracts also reduce “the cost associated with risk, one of
the most significant costs. This cost reduction is especially true for
risks that are impractical to insure. One aim of standard clauses is
indeed to address project risks and to specify how these risks are to be
managed.”3
Finally, the use of standard forms and model contracts reduces the
transaction costs of contract formation itself. “Standard form contracts
focus the parties’ attention on the terms that are normally open for
negotiation, the transaction’s ‘basic negotiable elements,’ and allow
the parties, indeed encourage them, to take the remainder for
granted.”4 Thus, “any costs related to drafting and negotiating will
consequently be reduced since the use of standard terms and
conditions will avoid the need for protracted debate on detailed
wording.”5 For these reasons, development agencies use model and
standard-form contracts.
Although development agencies use model contracts, the agencies
do not write them. Following the commercial construction industry’s
lead, development agencies use model contracts prepared by industry
associations; the most popular of these is the International Federation
of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC).6
FIDIC provides a number of model contracts, each one targeted at
a particular type of construction project. For example, the FIDIC
designed one contract for use with traditional civil engineering
projects, another for contractor-designed work, and yet another for

2
Catherine Pédamon, How Is Convergence Best Achieved in International
Project Finance?, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1272, 1296 (2001).
3
Id.
4
Id. at 1297–98.
5
Id.
6
FIDIC: International Federation of Consulting Engineers, http://www.fidic.org
(last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
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projects on a fixed-price or turnkey basis.7 This Article focuses on
FIDIC’s traditional civil engineering construction contract, known
informally as the “Red Book.”
There are two versions of the Red Book.8 The first, published in
1987,9 has found widespread use in private and public construction
projects throughout the world. A newer version, published in 1999,10
incorporates significant changes from the 1987 version, including
changes in risk allocation and dispute resolution. Development
agencies are free to use whichever version they choose.
In addition to the Red Book, in 2005 FIDIC published a contract
specifically designed for use in projects funded by multilateral
development banks such as the World Bank, Asian, and InterAmerican Banks. The Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) contract
is, in most respects, identical to the 1999 version of the Red Book.11
The choice facing development agencies is clear: should they use
the 1987 Red Book or switch to the 1999 and MDB versions of the
model contract? This paper will attempt to answer that question. Part
II of this paper will provide a brief summary of where development

7
Differences
between
the
various
contracts
are
available
at
http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/which_contract.asp (last visited Aug. 21,
2006).
8

In 1987, the FIDIC issued the first version of the Red Book, “Conditions of
Contract for Works of Civil Engineering Construction.” In 1999, it issued the second
version, entitled “Conditions of Contract for Construction.” (Note that FIDIC refers to
the 1999 version as the first edition. See infra note 10.)
9
FÉDÉRATION
INTERNATIONALE
DES
INGÉNIEURS-CONSEILS
(FIDIC)
[INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF CONSULTING ENGINEERS], CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT
FOR WORKS OF CIVIL ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION (1987) [hereinafter FIDIC 1987].
10
FÉDÉRATION
INTERNATIONALE
DES
INGÉNIEURS-CONSEILS
(FIDIC)
[INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF CONSULTING ENGINEERS], CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACT: CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION (1st ed. 1999) [hereinafter
FIDIC 1999].
11
FÉDÉRATION
INTERNATIONALE
DES
INGÉNIEURS-CONSEILS
(FIDIC)
[INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF CONSULTING ENGINEERS], CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT
FOR CONSTRUCTION (Multi-lateral Development Bank [MDB] Harmonized ed. 2005)
[hereinafter FIDIC MDB 2005]. For purposes of this paper, the 1999 Red Book and
the MDB contract will be treated as equivalent. For a discussion of differences
between the 1999 contract and the MDB contract, see Christopher Wade, Chairman of
FIDIC Contracts Committee, Private Practice United Kingdom and Adviser, SWECO
International, Sweden, The FIDIC Contract Forms and the New MDB Contract, Notes
from Presentation Given at ICC-FIDIC Conference, Paris (Oct. 2005),
http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/wade_oct05.pdf;
see
also
FIDIC,
Informational Article: Harmonised Form of FIDIC Construction Contract Agreed with
Multi-Lateral Development Banks, http://www1.fidic.org/resources/mdb/ (last visited
Aug. 22, 2006).
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agencies currently stand regarding the choice of model contracts. Part
III will compare the 1987 contract with the 1999 and MDB contracts,
and Part IV will explore implications that the different contracts
present as they relate to international development. Finally, Part V will
offer some conclusions and recommendations for the future of
international development contracts.
II. THE POSITIONS OF THE AGENCIES
Most of the major development agencies use one of the FIDIC
contracts. For example, USAID policy documents promote the use of
the 1987 Red Book for USAID-financed construction projects.12
Although the choice of contract provisions ultimately rests with
individual USAID field offices, USAID regulations and handbooks are
all geared for use with the 1987 FIDIC.13
In contrast, multilateral development banks have generally
adopted, or agreed to adopt, FIDIC’s 2005 MDB contract, which in
turn is based on FIDIC’s 1999 Red Book. The following banks both
participated in drafting the MDB contract and have agreed to its use:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the African Development Bank;
the Asian Development Bank;
the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank;
the Caribbean Development Bank;
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development;
the Inter-American Development Bank;
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank);
the Islamic Bank for Development; and
the Nordic Development Fund.14

12

See generally USAID, Chapter 2: Procurement of Construction Services, in
COUNTRY CONTRACTING HANDBOOK (2000), available at http://www.usaid.gov/
policy/ads/300/305mab.pdf.
13
See USAID, ADS 311: Local Procurement (2000), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/311.pdf.
14
Press Release, Enrico Vink, Managing Dir., FIDIC, Article for Information:
Harmonised Edition of the FIDIC Construction Contract Agreed with the Multilateral
Development Banks (Sept. 2005), available at http://www1.fidic.org/resources/
contracts/cons_mdb_may05_press_release_cw_sep05.pdf.
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The form of contract used by development agencies is not a trivial
matter. These agencies fund construction projects that are both very
costly and very important. Developing nations often depend on
development aid for the construction of critical infrastructure, such as
electrical and water treatment facilities. In addition, the sheer
monetary value of these projects makes even small differences in
contract provisions potentially very costly.
The reports of selected development agencies demonstrate the
magnitude of the issue. Since its founding in 1966, the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) has spent over $55 billion on infrastructure
projects.15 Infrastructure projects account for upwards of 60% of the
ADB’s loans, which loans totaled $5.8 billion in 2005, not including
grant monies.16 Likewise, between 1995 and 2005, the Inter-American
Development Bank approved $8.4 billion in loans for infrastructure
improvements.17 The World Bank lent $7.3 billion for infrastructure
projects in 2005—one-third of its entire lending budget.18
Thus, the FIDIC contracts govern a significant percentage of
foreign and multilateral aid. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say
that FIDIC contracts dominate international development construction
projects. Yet that recognition comes with a caveat: two versions of the
FIDIC contract are in use.19 USAID continues to use the 1987 version
and development banks continue to use the 2005 MDB version.
Was it wise for the multilateral development banks to adopt the
MDB contract in 2005? Should USAID follow suit and abandon the
1987 version in favor of the 1999 or the 2005 MDB contracts?
Answering those questions requires understanding the differences
between the various FIDIC contracts.
III. THE COMPARISON: 1987 VERSUS 1999 AND MDB
This Article compares two versions of the FIDIC Conditions of
Contract: the 1987 version with the 1999 and MDB versions. The
comparison that follows does not cover every difference between the
versions. Rather, it focuses on the most substantial differences,

15
Liqun Jin, Vice President, Asian Dev. Bank, Statement given at the FIDIC
2005 Annual Conference: Sustainability and Developing Asia, (Sept. 5, 2005).
16
ASIAN DEV. BANK, 2005 ANN. REP. 20, 33 (2005).
17
INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, 2005 ANN. REP. 23 (2005).
18
WORLD BANK, 2005 ANN. REP. 15 (2005).
19
Technically, there are three: 1987, 1999, and MDB. This paper treats the 1999
and MDB contracts as the same unless noted otherwise.
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particularly those that could impact the goals of foreign development,
namely increasing the number and scope of development projects, as
well as growing the local capacity within these states to sustain such
projects.
Before we begin, it is helpful to describe the various players in a
typical development project. The Employer is the entity, usually a
government agency in this context, that desires the infrastructure.
Typically, the Employer will own the project once it is completed. The
Contractor is the company hired to build the project. The Engineer is
an engineering professional, hired by the Employer, to oversee the
project from start to finish. The Engineer brings a level of technical
expertise to the project that the Employer often lacks. As we will see,
the Engineer occupies a sometimes-unclear position between the
Employer and the Contractor. Finally, projects often utilize a
Financer—an agency such as the World Bank that provides funds for
the project.
A. Comparison of Clauses
1. Clause 2.4: Employer’s financial arrangements
Clause 2.4 of the 1999 and MDB contracts introduces a provision
that did not exist in the 1987 contract. Clause 2.4 requires the
Employer to submit, within 28 days after a request from the
Contractor, reasonable evidence that the Employer has the funds to
pay the contract price.20 In addition, if the Employer intends to make a
material change to its financial arrangements, the Employer must give
notice to the Contractor along with detailed particulars. If the
Contractor does not receive the requested evidence, it can reduce the
rate of work, suspend work, and eventually terminate the contract.21
2. Clause 3: The engineer
Clause 3 marks a significant difference between the 1987 contract
and the 1999 and MDB contracts. Unlike the 1987 version, where
engineers were required to act impartially, under the 1999 and MDB

20

Peter L. Booen & Gordon L. Jaynes, The FIDIC’s 1999 Forms of Contract,
BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION LAW (2001), available at http://www1.fidic.org/
resources/contracts/booen_mar01.asp.
21
FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 16.
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versions the Engineer acts on behalf of the Employer.22 The Employer
also has additional ability to control the Engineer under the 1999 and
MDB contracts as compared with the 1987 version: the 1999 and
MDB contracts allow the Employer to replace the Engineer, a power
not given to the Employer by the 1987 contract.23 However, the 1999
and MDB contracts include a check on the Employer’s new ability: the
Contractor may veto a new engineer by raising reasonable and
supported objections.
In place of a neutral engineer, Clause 3 requires the Engineer to
make “fair determinations” in specified circumstances.24 Yet some
provisions do not invoke the fair determination requirement, such as
termination of contract due to force majeure.25 The implication is that
in these instances, the Engineer need not make fair determinations.26
Clause 3.1 identifies the Engineer as personnel of the Employer.
The result is that employers are now liable for the Engineer’s actions
and determinations because the Engineer is an employee of the
Employer under the 1999 and MDB contracts. Under Clause 17.1, the
Employer indemnifies and holds harmless the Contractor for claims
arising out of negligence, willful acts, or breach of contract by the
Employer or its personnel. Although the Employer gains control over
the Engineer, the Employer must also accept liability for the
Engineer’s actions.
3. Clause 4.1: Contractor’s general obligations
The 1999 and MDB contracts add a fitness requirement that was
not present in the 1987 version. If the Contractor must design any part
of the works, those parts must be “fit for the [intended] purpose;” thus,
requiring the Contractor to provide some level of warranty.

22

Id. at cl. 3.1.
Id. at cl. 3.4.
24
Id. at cls. 3.5 (when invoked), 14.6 (interim payment certificates), & 14.13
(final payment certificate).
25
Id. at cl. 19.6.
26
See David Bateson, FIDIC: New 1999 Edition of the Red Book: Impartiality
of the Engineer, (Aug. 2000), available at http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/
bateson_aug00.asp.
23
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4. Clause 4.12: Unforeseeable physical conditions
The 1999 and MDB contracts include a significant change in the
extent to which Contractors may claim additional payments on
grounds of unforeseeable physical conditions.27 Under the 1999 and
MDB versions, if the Contractor makes a claim for adverse physical
conditions, the Engineer may review whether other physical conditions
“in similar parts of the Works (if any)” were more favorable than
could reasonably have been foreseen. If the answer to this question is
yes, the Engineer, acting in his adjudicatory role, may reduce the
amount of extra cost claimed by the amount saved by the unforeseen
favorable conditions.28 Contrast the 1999 and MDB provision with the
1987 contract, which does not provide for this sort of offsetting. Under
the 1987 contract, negative unforeseeable conditions merit additional
costs regardless of whether unforeseeable positive conditions are
present elsewhere. The change has the effect of shifting risk to the
Contractor.29
5. Clause 15.5: Employer’s entitlement to termination
Clause 15.5 of the 1999 and MDB contracts gives the Employer a
power it does not have under the 1987 version: the power to terminate
the contract for convenience. Under Clause 15.5, the Employer may
terminate at any time for convenience, except in order to undertake the
works itself or to arrange for another contractor to do so. Payment to
the Contractor under these circumstances does not provide for profit—
merely costs.30 This clause creates the risk that the Contractor could
realize no profit for the job if the Employer finds himself in a situation
where termination of the project is required after the project has
begun.31

27

Booen & Jaynes, supra note 20.
FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 4.12.
29
See EUR. INT’L CONTRACTORS (EIC), EIC CONTRACTOR’S GUIDE TO THE FIDIC
“NEW RED BOOK”
(rev. 2003) [hereinafter EIC].
30
FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 19.6; see C.R. Seppala, FIDIC's New
Standard Forms of Contract: Force Majeure, Claims, Disputes and Other Clauses,
2000 INT’L CONSTRUCTION L. REV., 235, pt. I(5), II (2000).
31
See EIC, supra note 29.
28
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6. Clause 17.3: Employer’s risks
Clause 17 allocates risk of damage to the construction works
between the Contractor and the Employer.32 For the most part, the
Employer’s risks are the same under the 1999 and MDB contracts as
they were under the 1987 contract. The Employer’s risks under the
1999 and MDB contracts include losses resulting from the following:
(a) wars and hostilities that may occur anywhere in the world;
(b) rebellion, terrorism, and civil war, limited to the country of
the works;
(c) riot, commotion, disorder not by Contractor’s personnel,
limited to the country of the works;
(d) munitions of war, explosive materials, radiation not used
by the Contractor (the 1987 contract did not list munitions
of war and explosive materials under employer’s risks, but
under the 1999 contract, this risk is limited to the country
of works);
(e) pressure waves from supersonic aircraft;
(f) use or occupation by the Employer of works, unless
specified otherwise;
(g) design of works by the Employer or those for whom the
Employer is responsible;
(h) unforeseeable forces of nature or those against which an
experienced contractor could not reasonably have been
expected to take adequate preventive precautions.
If the works suffer damage due to the Employer’s risks, the
Contractor must rectify that damage if requested to do so by the
Engineer. Clause 17 under the 1999 and MDB contracts entitles the
Contractor to costs and extensions of time for this unexpected work.33
However, it entitles the Contractor to profit for rectifying only losses
caused by risks (f) and (g). This is a change from 1987, where the
Contractor was entitled to profit from rectifying all of the Employer’s
risks.34 This change increases the Contractor’s risk and decreases that
of the Employer.

32
See Nael G. Bunni, Recent Developments in Construction Disputology, 17 J.
INT’L ARB. 105, 105 (2000).
33
FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 17.4.
34
FIDIC 1987, supra note 9, at cls. 20.3 & 52.
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7. Clause 17.6: Limitation of liability
The 1987 contract does not contain clauses limiting the
Contractor’s liability, but the 1999 and MDB versions do. Clause 17.6
excludes the Contractor’s (and the Employer’s) liability for, among
other things, loss of use of the construction works, loss of profit, loss
of any contract, and indirect or consequential damage which may be
suffered by the other party. The same clause also places a monetary
limit on the Contractor’s total liability, unless stated otherwise in the
contract. Clause 17.6 does not limit liability in cases of fraud,
deliberate default, or reckless misconduct.
8. Clause 19: Force majeure
Clause 19 of the 1999 and MDB contracts introduces the concept
of force majeure.35 “Force majeure” replaces “special risks” in Clause
65 of the 1987 contract.36 Force majeure is defined as exceptional
events or circumstances that are (a) beyond a Party’s control, (b) could
not reasonably be provided against before entering into the contract,
(c) having arisen, could not reasonably be avoided or overcome, and
(d) are not substantially attributable to the other party.37 Clause 19.1
provides a non-exhaustive list, including events such as war,
hostilities, terrorism, riots, and natural disasters.
The 1999 and MDB “force majeure” language is broader than the
1987 “special risks” language. Under the 1987 contract, the only openended language referred to natural disasters; otherwise, the list of
special risks was exhaustive. Under the 1999 and MDB contracts, the
definition of force majeure is entirely open-ended. An unimagined, but
human-caused event would be covered if it met the criteria of 19.1. In
this instance, the 1999 and MDB contracts give more risk to the
Employer than does the 1987 version by encompassing a greater
universe of events for which the Employer is essentially liable.
If events of force majeure occur, they allow the Contractor to
obtain extensions of time and incur additional costs.38

35
36

Seppala, supra note 30, at pt. I(4).
See Bunni, supra note 32 (criticizing the use of force majeure in lieu of special

risks).
37
38
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9. Clause 20: Claims, disputes, and arbitration
The 1999 contract sets out an entirely new dispute resolution
scheme. Under the 1987 contract, dispute resolution progressed
according to article 67:
Engineer’s Decision Æ Amicable Settlement Æ Arbitration.
Clause 20 of the 1999 and MDB contracts provide instead for:
Engineer’s Decision Æ Dispute Adjudication Board Æ Amicable
Settlement Æ Arbitration.
At first glance, this change in process seems insignificant, yet the
Dispute Adjudication Board (Dispute Board) system is robust. Under
1999 and MDB Clause 20.2, the Dispute Board is to be formed in
advance of actual disputes.39 It begins meeting when a dispute arises,
and makes decisions according to a set of rules and procedures laid out
in Clauses 20.2 through 20.5. The Dispute Board is made up of either
one or three members, as specified in an appendix attached to the
tender documents. The Dispute Board’s decisions are final, unless a
party to the dispute gives notice of dissatisfaction within twenty-eight
days. Regardless, Dispute Board decisions are immediately binding.
Arbitration is possible only after going through the Dispute Board
process, and even then only if a party has filed a timely notice of
dissatisfaction with the Dispute Board’s decision.40
B. Summary of the Comparison
The two FIDIC contracts differ most obviously at the
organizational level. The 1999 and MDB contracts categorize the
seventy-two provisions found in the 1987 contract and arrange them
into twenty clauses. Such modifications are essentially cosmetic; the
number of actual provisions is about the same between the versions.

39
See Seppala, supra note 30, at pt. II (discussing the difference between
standing and ad hoc DABs).
40
FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 20.4.
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Yet it would be a mistake to view the 1999 and MDB contracts as
merely a reworking of the 1987 contract.41 While the 1999 and MDB
contracts do contain some refinements to the 1987 version, they also
contain substantive alterations that affect the way the contract
functions.
Changes in risk allocation are difficult to summarize. Compared to
the 1987 contract, the 1999 and MDB versions shift some risks to the
Contractor and other risks to the Employer. Without consulting
actuarial data regarding particular projects in specific locations, it is
meaningless to weigh these risks against each other in the hope of
deciding whether the 1999 and MDB contracts transfer greater risk to
one party or the other. What can be said is that none of the three
contracts are unbalanced. Each assigns risk in a logical way, and all
seem to provide a workable contractual framework.
Changes in the dispute resolution mechanisms are fairly
straightforward; however, it is useful to consider the role of the
Engineer and the dispute settlement provisions together. Having given
up on the idea of an impartial engineer, the FIDIC felt the need to
insert another stage into the dispute settlement process: the Dispute
Board. Practically speaking, the Dispute Board sits somewhere
between amicable settlement and arbitration, providing a decisionmaking body that allows parties to continue performance of the
contract even during a dispute over the contract’s content or
requirements.42
In light of these changes, parties to foreign aid contracts must
decide which set of contract provisions they prefer: those under the
1987 version or those under the 1999 and MDB versions. The question
then becomes which contract is better for development.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT
The differences between the various FIDIC contracts are
significant in two ways. First, the differences demonstrate the evolving
nature of international finance contracts. More importantly, the
differences have real-world implications for the practice of foreign
development. Contractual provisions can promote or deter

41

At least one of the drafters of the 1999 FIDIC contract agrees. Christopher
Wade, FIDIC’s Standard Forms of Contract: Principles and Scope of the Four New
Books, 2001 INT’L CONSTRUCTION L. REV 5, (2001).
42
See EIC, supra note 29 (discussing the relationship between an impartial
engineer and the DAB).
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development, and they can reduce or increase the costs of development
projects. Given the size and importance of development construction
projects, the implications of relevant contractual provisions deserve
scrutiny.
Some of the differences between the 1987 FIDIC contract and the
1999 and MDB contracts will have little impact on development
projects. These changes will be discussed in part A below. However,
other changes have potentially wide reaching implications that will
affect development in both positive and negative ways. Some of these
changes will be discussed in part B below.
A. Minor and Benign Changes
Generally, it is inaccurate to think of the 1999 and MDB contracts
as updated versions of the 1987 contract because the differences
between the contract versions are simply too great. However, some
differences can be viewed as mere updates, beneficial changes, or
neutral modifications that do not have major implications for the
utility of the contract as a whole.
One example of a benign change is Clause 2.4 of the 1999 and
MDB contracts. The requirement in Clause 2.4 that the Employer
prove it has the ability to pay for the contract should not cause
significant problems for international development projects.
Development agencies, after all, should easily be able to demonstrate
that they have sufficient funds to complete their obligations under a
given contract. If the development agency cannot come up with such
proof, then it seems there is nothing wrong with giving the Contractor
the right to back out of the contract. In reality, ensuring that a
perspective party to a contract has adequate funding is a basic practice.
Clause 2.4 will likely forestall disputes and reduce contractors’ risks,
which in turn, would allow contractors to perform construction
projects at lower costs. Clause 2.4 is thus a minor, but welcome
innovation to be viewed as the solidification of an already common
practice.
Another minor change, and welcome addition, is seen in Clause
4.1 of the 1999 and MDB contracts. Clause 4.1 introduces a fitness
requirement for contractor-designed portions of the contract. The
rationale here is that the Contractor is in a better position than the
Employer to reduce the risk that the Contractor’s designs are unfit;
thus, it is efficient to require the Contractor’s designs to be “fit for the
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purpose” that they were intended.43 Again, a small change to contract
provisions works to reduce the cost of contracting and thus promotes
foreign development.
Clause 17.6 also marks a minor change for the better. By placing
limits on the Contractor’s liability—such as by excluding loss of use
of the works and loss of the Employer’s profits—the 1999 and MDB
contracts reduce the Contractor’s risks. Facing less risk, a rational
contractor can work for lower payments; thus, development projects
are easier for development agencies to afford.
Clause 19 has a similar effect. The 1999 and MDB contracts adopt
the concept of “force majeure,” as opposed to “special risks,” the
language used in the 1987 contract. In so doing, the 1999 contract
expands the Employer’s risks by covering unforeseeable human and
natural events; the 1987 clause covered unforeseeable natural events,
but only certain specified human events.
This expansion in the Employer’s liability is welcome. Force
majeure risks—those risks that neither party can adequately prepare
for—should be borne by the Employer. The Employer alone knows
how valuable the project will prove to be and can thus determine, once
a force majeure event has actually occurred, how much the Employer
is willing to pay to recover from the unforeseen event. Contractors
have no such ability because they must price contracts in advance of
performance. If contractors bore the risk of force majeure events, they
would be obliged to include significant “padding” into their contract
prices to cover those risks. The result would be increasingly expensive
contracts—and thus fewer development projects overall.
Several other differences between the 1987 contract and the 1999
and MDB contracts can be viewed in the same light.44 Viewed at best
43

FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 4.1.
A good example of this is Clause 13.7’s treatment of changes in legislation
and Clause 17.1’s indemnity provisions. Clause 13.7 of the 1999 and MDB contracts
provides the Contractor with almost the same protection against changes in legislation
as did Clause 70.2 of 1987. Two changes have been made: first, the “28 days prior to
the latest date for submission” timing criterion of 1987 has been replaced with a
simple reference to the base date of the contract; second, the 1999 and MDB versions
expand the coverage of this provision to include changes in law arising from new
judicial or governmental interpretations of existing laws, not only new laws and
regulations themselves as under the 1987 contract.
As for indemnities, the 1999 version requires the Contractor to indemnify the
Employer for most of the same things required by 1987 version. One change has been
made: under the 1999 and MDB versions, the Contractor is only liable for property
damage (other than to the works) that arise out of (1) the Contractor’s design and
execution of the works or (2) negligence or willful act or breach by the Contractor.
17.1.a.ii. Contrast this with Clause 22.1 of the 1987 contract, which provides for
44
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as updates or improvements to existing provisions, these changes are
benign. Such changes may individually have only minor implications
for foreign development contracts. However, these minor changes are
desirable insofar as they encourage foreign development.
B. The Engineer and the Dispute Board: A Major Change
Changes to the role of the Engineer and to dispute resolution
procedures are not minor. On the contrary, the magnitude of the
differences between the 1987 contract and the 1999 and MDB
contracts in these areas can hardly be overstated. Where the 1987
contract calls for an impartial engineer, the 1999 and MDB contracts
consider the Engineer to be an agent of the Employer.45 Where the
1987 contract calls for informal mediation, the 1999 and MDB
contracts call for formal adjudication. These large changes have
equally sizeable implications for foreign development projects.
At first glance, Clause 3’s adoption of a partial engineer seems
undesirable. The Project Engineer is the liaison between the Employer
and the Contractor, tasked with translating the sterile details of a
contract into actual performance on the ground. The Engineer also
plays a role in dispute resolution, examining disputes before they
proceed to more formal means of dispute settlement. It seems
appropriate that such a crucial intermediary as the Engineer be
impartial.
Yet it is not at all clear that project engineers are ever truly
impartial. Development professionals have suggested that engineers
are quite cognizant of who pays the bills for development projects.46
Though under the 1987 contract engineers may be formally impartial,
they may work closely with, and in effect take orders from the
Employer. Against this backdrop, the provisions of the 1999 and MDB
contracts make more sense. If engineers are never truly impartial, then
Contractor liability regardless of fault. Thus, the 1999 contract reduces the
Contractor’s risk as compared with the 1987 contract.
The MDB contract differs from the 1999 contract regarding indemnities. Clause
17.1(b) of the MDB contract remains truer to the 1987 version than does the 1999
contract. The MDB version holds the Contractor liable for damages, regardless of the
Contractor’s negligence or fault, unless the Employer’s own negligence or intentional
acts caused the damage. In this instance, the MDB contract places greater risk on the
Contractor than does the 1999 contract.
45
For a discussion of differing treatment of the role of the Engineer in the FIDIC
contracts, see Bateson, supra note 26.
46
These development professionals are Project Engineers who, on condition of
anonymity, spoke with the Author during several informal discussions.
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it makes sense to contract around that fact—to recognize their
partiality and deal with it.
By making the Engineer’s relationship with the Employer explicit,
the 1999 and MDB contracts clarify the relationships between the
relevant actors. The new provisions no longer place the Engineer in
the difficult, and perhaps unsustainable, position of being “neutral.”
This change allows the parties, as well as the Engineer, to proceed
with greater clarity than they could under the 1987 contract. This
should result in a smoother and more efficient interaction between the
parties involved, leading to a reduction in overall costs.
However, it was not possible to merely abandon the neutrality of
the Engineer. Under the 1987 contract, the Engineer had an important
dispute resolution role to play: he or she functioned as a “quasiarbitrator,” deciding disputes before they proceeded to arbitration or
adjudication.47 If the Engineer is not neutral, that dispute resolution
role becomes awkward to say the least.
Concerns about the neutrality of the Engineer prompted FIDIC to
look for alternative-dispute-resolution mechanisms.48 The solution
FIDIC settled on was the Dispute Adjudication Board, a dispute
mechanism inserted into the dispute process that can realistically claim
neutrality.49 The changes to the position of the Engineer and to dispute
resolution are thus closely related. It is crucial to view development
contracts holistically. The non-neutral Engineer and the Dispute Board
must be viewed as a package.
The Dispute Adjudication Board functions as a bridge between the
two poles of dispute resolution procedures: on the one hand cheap,
quick, and informal, but potentially biased dispute resolution by the
Engineer; on the other, expensive, slow, formal, and neutral
procedures such as binding arbitration and adjudication by courts. The
Dispute Board occupies the middle ground. The Board is neutral and
uses established procedures for investigation and decision-making.
Yet, it is quicker and more flexible than arbitration or adjudication.
The Board is a critical part of the 1999 and MDB contracts, although
there are implications for development.
To understand the impact of the Dispute Board, it is first necessary
to understand where the idea of dispute boards originated. FIDIC

47
48
49

cl. 20.
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certainly did not invent the concept.50 In fact, Dispute Boards—
confusingly sometimes called Dispute Adjudication Boards and
sometimes Dispute Resolution Boards—have a long pedigree within
the construction industry.51 Dr. Nael Bunni has tracked the popularity
of dispute boards in the years leading up to their introduction in the
FIDIC contract.52 Bunni has found that in 1988, dispute boards settled
only sixteen construction disputes. By 1999, that number had risen to
758, a 47-fold increase in just over ten years.53 The dollar value of
contracts that include a Dispute Board provision had similarly
increased from $1.4 billion in 1988 to $32.6 billion in 1999.54
Dispute Boards became particularly popular outside of the United
States. In England, Dispute Adjudication Boards are now mandatory
for construction contracts.55 The World Bank also introduced dispute
boards into its development projects, an innovation that served as the
model upon which FIDIC Dispute Boards were ultimately based.56
Dispute boards have a number of advantages over other disputeresolution systems. One particularly useful effect of the Dispute Board
system is “effectively to prevent disputes and to assist the Parties in
solving them as soon as [the disputes] appear.”57 Resolution is
accomplished more quickly because the Dispute Boards are formed at
the very beginning of contract performance. The boards are thus in
place before any disputes arise, and can help parties reach solutions
before problems get out of hand.58

50

For a discussion of developments in FIDIC dispute resolution, see Bunni,
supra note 32.
51
Briefing, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Dispute Review Boards, (May
2006), available at http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2006/15119.pdf.
52
Bunni, supra note 32.
53
Id. at 112.
54
Id.
55
Loukas A. Mistelis, ADR in England and Wales, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 167,
204 (2001).
56
Bunni, supra note 32 at 105, 107. However, note that the World Bank’s
Dispute Resolution Board before the Bank’s adoption of the MDB contract functioned
differently from the Dispute Board ultimately adopted by FIDIC. Most important, the
FIDIC Board’s decisions are immediately binding on parties, while Board decisions
under the old Bank contracts were binding only if neither party objected. Id.
57
Pierre M. Genton, The DRB/DAB: An Attractive Procedure if One Takes
Certain Precautions, 4 FOUNDATION FORUM, Issue 2 (2000).
58
Pierre Genton labels this an “ongoing dispute resolution role” of the Dispute
Board. He argues that dispute boards can be quite effective in managing “informal
disputes,” disputes that have yet to progress to the stage where parties make formal
claims against each other. Id.
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Once a formal dispute has arisen, dispute boards are useful
because they provide quick and binding decisions. Parties may object
to the Dispute Board’s decisions, and pursue further adjudication;
however, the Dispute Board’s decision remains binding throughout
this process. The binding nature of Board decisions allows parties to
move forward with performance of the contract, even while pursuing
adjudication of disputes.59
Finally, dispute boards are useful in situations “where recourse to
local courts is undesirable.”60 Perhaps local courts are seen as
inefficient, expensive, corrupt, or biased; in such a case, dispute
boards offer a binding alternative, significantly reducing the need for
local courts’ involvement in the dispute process.
Dispute boards reduce and manage conflict, allow performance to
continue despite disputes, and minimize recourse to local courts. To be
fair, these benefits are partially offset by additional costs. The addition
of an extra layer of dispute procedures potentially increases the costs
and time associated with dispute resolution. For example, Board
members must be paid, and Board investigations could disrupt the
construction process. Nevertheless, the benefits associated with the use
of dispute boards outweigh the costs. By providing a flexible but
robust dispute-resolution mechanism, the board system should allow
construction contracts to proceed more smoothly and efficiently than
was possible without dispute boards. Dispute boards provide a
relatively fast and inexpensive alternative to the more cumbersome
formal adjudication procedures.
Viewed as a single set of reforms, the changes to the status of the
Engineer and to dispute-resolution provisions mark a significant
advancement in development contracts. When it comes to these issues,
the 1999 and MDB contracts are superior to the 1987 contract for
development purposes.
C. Unforeseeable Physical Conditions:
A Questionable Shift in Risk
Not all changes between the FIDIC contracts are so welcome. The
1999 and MDB contracts treat unforeseeable physical conditions quite
differently than does the 1987 contract. On balance, this change is
counter-productive.

59
Mistelis, supra note 55, at 204 (terming board decisions “binding, but not
necessarily final”).
60
Genton, supra note 57.
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Under the 1987 contract, a contractor that encountered
unforeseeable conditions—for example, large rocks hidden under the
soil—was entitled to additional costs and extensions of time from the
Employer. The same holds true for 1999 and MDB version, but with a
crucial difference: the Engineer can now offset extra costs and time if
he or she finds unforeseeable beneficial conditions elsewhere in the
project site.61
The effect of this change is to shift risk from the Employer to the
Contractor. Under the 1987 contract, the Employer bore the risk of all
unforeseen conditions. Yet under the 1999 and MDB contracts, the
Employer bears only the risk of unforeseen negative conditions that
are not offset by unforeseen positive conditions. Contractors will get
fewer extensions of time and fewer additional costs under these new
provisions.
At first glance, the change seems desirable. In principle,
contractors should not be awarded additional costs and time if, on
balance, other parts of the project turn out to be easier, faster, or
cheaper than expected. It seems only fair that beneficial and
detrimental conditions should be considered together.
However, that which is equitable is not always efficient. By
shifting risk to the Contractor, the 1999 and MDB contracts could
cause contractors to demand unnecessarily high prices. This, in turn,
would reduce the number and scope of development projects
development agencies can afford.
In order to understand this problem, it helps to consider the
reasons for including an unforeseen conditions provision in the first
place. For example, consider a contract that did not include an
unforeseen-conditions provision where a contractor has agreed to
excavate a foundation for some specified amount of money and in a
certain number of days. An experienced contractor will know, in
advance, that unforeseeable conditions could delay progress or
increase expenses. The Contractor will thus increase the price he or
she charges in an attempt to cover that possibility. The question
remains—how much should the Contractor “pad” the price? These
risks are, by definition, unforeseeable. The Contractor is thus forced to
overestimate the danger of unforeseen risks, lest he or she be left with
an unprofitable job.
Contrast that situation with a contract containing an unforeseeableconditions clause. Under this type of contract, the Contractor is able to

61
FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 4.12; FIDIC MDB 2005, supra note 11, at
cl. 4.12.
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quote a price that covers the cost of the job and no more, without
worrying about unforeseeable conditions. If unforeseeable conditions
do arise, the contract price can be increased appropriately.
An unforeseeable-conditions clause results in cheaper contracts for
two reasons. First, the clause removes the need for contractors to pad
their contract prices.62 For projects that do not encounter unforeseeable
conditions, this will result in lower costs. Second, the clause changes
the time at which costs of unforeseeable events are to be calculated.
Without the clause, these costs must be estimated—or more
accurately, guessed—in advance. In such a situation, overestimating
the cost is likely. With the clause, the costs can be tailored to the
actual conditions encountered; there is no need for overestimating
risk.63 Unforeseeable-conditions clauses thus minimize the costs of
construction projects whether or not unforeseen conditions actually
arise.
Thus, it becomes clear that an unforeseeable-conditions clause
should be included in international development contracts. But what is
wrong with the 1999 and MDB provisions? Clause 4.12 provides for
additional costs and extensions of time, as long as they are not offset
by unforeseeable positive conditions. One might argue that the
balancing of positive and negative unforeseeable conditions is a
superior way to allocate risk because it avoids giving extra costs and
extensions of time to the Contractor when they are not actually
needed.
This argument is mistaken. By introducing the concept of
conditions-balancing, the 1999 and MDB contracts have given
contractors a reason to once again pad their prices.64 The problem is
risk: contractors cannot be certain that engineers (and dispute boards,
etc.) will correctly weigh unforeseen positive and negative
conditions.65 There is a danger that engineers will consider an
62
Hazel Glenn Beh, Allocating the Risk of the Unforeseen, Subsurface and
Latent Conditions in Construction Contracts: Is There Room for the Common Law?,
46 KAN. L. REV. 115, 133 (1997).
63
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Extra Work in Construction Cases: Restitution,
Relationship, and Revision, 63 TUL. L. REV. 799, 813 n. 65 (1989).
64
It is difficult to prove this assertion. Contractors who bid for projects will not
be willing to admit that they are padding their prices, but it is rational for them to do
so for the reasons given. As with much of contract law, the goal should be to design
away these temptations, even if the danger is only theoretical.
65
Other dangers of risk shifting exist. “[M]erely transferring risks blindly from
the Employer to the Contractor will not necessarily better ensure that the works are
done on time or at the agreed price. Instead, this may, at best, cause more claims and
disputes and, at worst, bankrupt the Contractor, thereby requiring the Employer to re-
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unforeseen to condition to be offset by an unforeseeable positive
condition when in fact it is not; rational contractors will respond to
that possibility by padding their prices. Therefore, a major purpose of
unforeseeable-conditions clauses is undermined.
There is another problem with Clause 4.12. No matter how
equitable or fair the clause is, it increases the likelihood of disputes
because contractors are likely to view findings of beneficial conditions
with hostility. The clause makes an already difficult determination
even more complex66 by providing parties with one more thing to
argue about. It is not a minor point: disputes about whether or not
unforeseen conditions are offset by other unforeseen conditions could
be costly to resolve and almost impossible to settle.
It was a mistake to change the unforeseeable-conditions clause.
The 1999 and MDB provisions on unforeseeable conditions are likely
to increase the cost of contracting and lead to protracted disputes, thus
making international development projects more difficult to fund and
complete. Therefore, the 1987 provisions are preferable on this issue.
D. The Risk of Realizing No Profits
FIDIC made another change for the worse when dealing with
contractors’ profits. In two key situations, the 1999 and MDB
contracts reduce or eliminate the ability of contractors to profit from
their work. The risk of an unprofitable job is a serious deterrent to any
contractor, and it has major consequences for international
development.
Ultimately, the profit clauses are counterproductive; they impair,
not promote, international development. The clauses at issue are 15.5
and 17.3. Clause 15.5 sets out the Employer’s entitlement to
termination. If the Employer exercises that right, and terminates the
contract before it has been completed, the Employer need only pay the
Contractor costs, not profit. Even if the Contractor has completed
ninety-nine percent of the contract, the Employer’s right to termination
destroys the Contractor’s ability to profit from the job. The best he or
she can do is break even.

bid the job and, almost inevitably, pay a higher price to get the work done.” C.R.
Seppala, FIDIC's New Standard Forms of Construction Contract: an Introduction
(2000), http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/seppala.asp.
66
This information was obtained during informal discussions between the
Author and several Development Project Engineers who later asked that their remarks
remain anonymous. These Engineers indicated that awards of additional cost and time
extensions are judgment calls at best.
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A similar result is reached under Clause 17.3, which sets out
“Employer’s Risks.” If there are events and circumstances that may
harm the project, the resulting damage must be paid for by the
Employer, not the Contractor. Clause 17.3 includes such things as war,
natural disasters, and riots. The problem with this clause is not the risk
allocation itself; it is how damage to the project is to be rectified.
Clause 17.4 requires the Contractor to rectify damage to the project
that results from the Employer’s risks. The Contractor is entitled to
extra payments covering his or her additional costs in this situation,
but not any additional profits.67 If a hurricane destroys a project one
week before completion, the Contractor would have to rebuild the
entire project—often a task of years, given the size of development
projects—but will receive no additional profits to compensate for the
opportunity cost the Contractor has incurred. This clause is
particularly harmful given the great amount of profit a contractor
could potentially lose due to the increased time needed to complete a
project.
These provisions are not typical in construction contracts. The lack
of profit in the event of employer’s termination is particularly
extraordinary. Discussing contracts with the United States
Government, one commentator writes, “In virtually every case, the
termination for convenience clause entitles the Contractor to recover
costs incurred, profit on work done, and costs of preparing the
termination proposal no matter what type of contract it executed with
the Government.”68 Even the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit held that contractors are entitled to “costs incurred, profit on
work done and the costs of preparing the termination settlement
proposal” when a contract has been terminated for the convenience of
the Employer.69 Regulations promulgated by the U.S. Government
recognize that entitlement, stating that “[a] settlement should
compensate the Contractor fairly for the work done and the
preparations made for the terminated portions of the contract,
including a reasonable allowance for profit.”70

67

But see FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 17.4; FIDIC MDB 2005, supra note
11, at cl. 17.4 (stating that the Contractor is entitled to extra profits when the risks are
the fault of the Employer or agents thereof).
68
Graeme S. Henderson, Terminations for Convenience and the Termination
Costs Clause, 53 A.F. L. REV. 103, 104 (2002) (emphasis added).
69
Maxima Corp. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
70
48 C.F.R. § 49.201(a) (2005) (discussing termination for convenience in
fixed-cost contracts). “The FAR is the primary regulation for use by all Federal
Executive agencies in their acquisition of supplies and services with appropriated
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As for the question of profit on rectifying damage caused by
employers’ risks, “courts are often willing to award contractor profits
for extra work, even when not provided by the contract.”71 The 1999
and MDB contracts, however, do not allow contractors to claim profits
in either of these two instances. That marks a significant change from
the 1987 contract, which allowed profit both in the event of
termination for convenience and for rectifying damage. Under the
1999 and MDB contracts, a contractor’s ability to make a profit is at
the mercy of both the employers, and fate.
This is bad policy. First, the risk that a contractor could be left
with no profits might induce some contractors to—dishonestly—
overprice their “costs” in order to guarantee that they will walk away
from a job with money in their pockets. As for employers, their ability
to determine whether contractors will receive profits can work as a
bludgeon, allowing opportunistic employers to take advantage of a
contractor’s weak position.72 These clauses bring out the worst in
contractors and employers.
The problems go beyond dishonest or opportunistic parties. Even
if everyone involved acts in good faith, the danger of realizing no
profits will retard the goals of international development. The key is
the notion of profit, and how it means different things to different
types of contractors. For example, consider a water infrastructure
project in a developing country, funded by a multilateral development
bank. Some projects will be of such a size that local contractors have
the capacity to do the job; however, other projects will be too large,
and only foreign construction firms will suffice. From time to time,
both local and foreign contractors will be interested in a job, and it is
here that profit becomes most important.
For a multinational construction corporation, the risk of realizing
no profits is just one more risk to factor into the contract price.
Furthermore, that risk can be spread out across numerous construction
projects around the world, effectively diversifying the company’s risk
portfolio. Most importantly, the achievement of profit has little or
nothing to do with the salaries received by the corporation’s decision
makers. They receive a salary, which is then factored into the “cost”
portion of the contract itself. Their personal income is only indirectly,
if at all, tied to the profits of an individual contract.
funds.” U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., REGULATORY REFERENCE OVERVIEW,
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/channelView.do?pageTypeId=8199&channelId=13342 (last visited April 24, 2007).
71
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., supra note 63, at 840.
72
See id.
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Contrast that example with a smaller, privately held construction
company, likely operating in only one country. The small company
can price the risk of no profits into its contract price, but it cannot
diversify that risk to anywhere near the same extent as can a large
company. That fact alone is likely to make a small contractor more
risk averse than a large contractor, yet it gets worse. For a privately or
closely held company, profits are often directly tied to the income of
decision-makers in the company. Indeed, for a private company, the
owner may not even receive a salary; the profits and the owner’s takehome pay may be one and the same.73
To put it bluntly, if a large corporation receives no profits, its
shareholders receive no dividends. If a small company receives no
profits, its owner may not be able to buy food. Since profit means
different things to different types of contractors, the risk of realizing
no profits has a differential impact as well. The risk of no profits will
serve to weed out small, local contractors. The water treatment plant
still gets built, but not by locals. That result is bad for development.
With a development project, building the infrastructure is just part of
the goal: the development of local capacity is also crucial to the longterm growth of developing states.74 The 1999 and MDB contracts’
shortsightedness ignores the need to promote local contractors, which
is bad for development.75
Clauses 15.5 and 17.3 are large steps in the wrong direction.
Compared to the 1987 contract, the 1999 and MDB version treats

73
Glenn Beh, supra note 62, at 152 n.160 (making a similar but more technical
argument).
74
For that matter, the same could be said for developed states. Gene Ming Lee,
A Case for Fairness in Public Works Contracting, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1091
(1996) (“Government construction serves many purposes [besides providing
infrastructure]. . . . Spending on public works also provides a stimulus to the local
economy through the creation of jobs”).
75
There may be other reasons to maintain a large pool of potential contractors as
well. See Glenn Beh, supra note 62, at 135–36. (“A large owner, especially the federal
government, may have an interest in protecting and maintaining a financially healthy
pool of qualified bidders for its projects and find this desirable even though it
increases its own costs. After all, these large owners conduct business through bidding
and each needs a pool of bidders in order to ensure competition. Additionally, the
large owner may require extremely specialized work that only a small group of
contractors can perform. One very costly job may drive a contractor out of business,
eventually hurting the large owner who requires specialized services in multiple
contracts . . . Moreover, contractors may elect not to bid on high-risk projects, finding
the risks unacceptably high. In the long run, a reluctance to compete among qualified
bidders injures the large owner.”)
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profit in a way that is unfair, costly, discriminatory in impact, and
counter-productive.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Not all the differences between the 1987 contract and the more
recent 1999 and MDB versions are so undesirable. As we have seen,
some changes are advantageous. Some of these improvements are
minor, but others are revolutionary: the adoption of a Dispute
Adjudication Board is a particularly welcome development.
Nonetheless, it is not at all clear that development agencies should
adopt the more recent versions of the FIDIC contract. Construction
projects funded by development agencies form a crucial part of some
countries’ infrastructure. Tinkering with the contracts that govern
those projects should only happen when necessary, and only if done
with great care.
Neither the 1999 contract nor the 2005 contract written by the
development banks should be used for development projects. These
contracts are likely to result in costlier projects, reduction in
competition, and disadvantages to those who need development aid
most. However, it is not necessary to abandon the 1999 and MDB
contracts entirely because their improvements, especially the creation
of a dispute board, can and should be incorporated into development
contracts on a piecemeal basis.
An even better solution would be the creation of a 2007 standard
form contract similar in style and form to the 1999 and 2005 contracts.
It should retain the positive changes as outlined in this paper and
incorporate the unenforceable conditions clause found in the original
1987 standard. Likewise, Clauses 15.5 and 17.3 should be removed.
The decision by development agencies to update their construction
contracts is laudable. Development projects should be governed by the
most effective contract provisions available, and innovations in the
law should be embraced, but change is not always desirable. In
international development contracts, the touchstone must always be
development: if a contract does not promote development, it is
counterproductive. Such is the case with the new FIDIC contracts.
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